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Abstract. Coercion-resistance is one of the key requirements of voting
systems as it prevents an outsider from trying to persuade the voter to
vote in a certain way. Although it usually implies receipt-freeness [15], it
is usually formalised as a stronger property [23]. In this paper we analyse
two voting schemes for coercion-resistance, namely Preˆt a` Voter [12] and
FOO [17], and find that many of the requirements can be expressed in
terms of a fairly recent security property, opacity [5]. We then present a
new formalisation of coercion-resistance by casting it as opacity.
1 Introduction
Coercion-resistance is essential in voting systems, as it ensures the voter’s right to
vote according to her free will. It can also have an impact on other requirements
such as ballot secrecy, legitimacy and eligibility. Loss of ballot secrecy lays a
scheme open to coercion, as the value of a coerced vote is no longer confidential.
Legitimacy may be undermined as the coercer can potentially vote more than
once by forcing or bribing several voters to cast certain votes. Furthermore, he
may not be an eligible voter. Election integrity could be at risk, as coerced votes
may not reflect the electorate’s true choice.
Although the terms “coercion-resistance” and “receipt-freeness” are some-
times used interchangeably, coercion-resistance is usually understood to be a
stronger property. “Receipt-freeness” means that a voter is unable to construct
a proof of her vote, whereas coercion-resistance means that the coercer is unable
to distinguish between an instance when the voter votes Vi, and when the voter
votes Vj , where Vi is a vote supplied by the coercer, possibly null or a random
value, and Vj the voter’s choice. This prevents an outsider trying to persuade
the voter to vote in a certain way, and also deters “vote-buying”.
Note that the term “receipt-freeness” can be misleading. In some schemes,
such as FOO, the voter does not obtain a physical receipt, but may still be able
to construct a proof of her vote. In the FOO scheme, the voter submits her vote,
which has been committed with a random factor. She later reveals the value of
her vote using this random factor when checking a publicly-accessible bulletin
board. This allows the voter to verify that her vote has been correctly recorded
by the system, but the loophole is that the voter merely has to supply the coercer
with the random factor to prove her vote. Alternatively, the voter could use a
random factor provided by the coercer. In either case, coercion-resistance fails.
In some schemes the voter does obtain a physical receipt, but it is constructed
in such a way that it does not provide readily verifiable proof of a vote to a third
party. Examples of voting systems with this feature are Preˆt a` Voter and the
Chaum [11] and Neff [27],[28], [29] schemes.
Another way to express indistinguishability between “true” and “false” votes,
is by using opacity [5], [6], [7] Intuitively, a predicate, φ, is opaque if for every
run in which φ is true, there exists an indistinguishable run in which it is false.
For example, φ could be defined as the valid encryption of the voter’s “true”
vote. To satisfy opacity, an observer should be unable to distinguish between
valid and invalid encryptions of votes that may be cast by the voter. Note that
the “observer” in this case is anyone eavesdropping on an execution of the voting
protocol, other than the voter and possibly the authority. Clearly, the voter will
know how she voted, and the authority may have access to the voter’s keys. Note,
however, that authority knowledge of ballot information has been identified as
a potential vulnerability in Preˆt a` Voter, and a scheme for distributed ballot
creation has been proposed [33]. Likewise, in a remote implementation of Preˆt a`
Voter [13], methods are being investigated for construction and distribution of
capabilities to minimise trust in the authority. The difficulty, however, is proving
the validity of a capability only to the designated voter. This is currently under
investigation.
In this paper, two voting schemes are analysed for their coercion-resistance,
namely Preˆt a` Voter [12] and the FOO [17] scheme. Preˆt a` Voter is fairly resistant
to coercion [32], whereas the FOO scheme is vulnerable to this type of attack.
Even without weaknesses in the protocol, coercion-resistance in a remote voting
scheme, such as FOO, cannot be guaranteed. The the attacker could be physically
present at the time of casting a vote, and the voter could be forced to vote as
instructed. The voter could also hand over her voting keys to the attacker, either
willingly of under threat. We discuss this further in the next section. Another
complication with the FOO scheme is that communication between the voter
and the system must be anonymous [17], which can be difficult to implement.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Related work is discussed in Section 2.
Brief overviews are given for Preˆt a` Voter and the FOO scheme in Section 3. In
Sections 4 and 5, Preˆt a` Voter and the FOO scheme are respectively assessed for
coercion-resistance, taking into consideration several different possible capabil-
ities of an attacker. The aim is to determine whether the requirements of each
scheme for coercion-resistance can be expressed in terms of opacity. As will be
seen shortly, this is indeed the case. In addition, opacity has the ability to cap-
ture different forms of coercion-resistance. Following the analysis in Section 6,
coercion-resistance is formally cast as opacity. We finally present our conclusions
in Section 7. A formal definition of opacity is given in Appendix A
2 Related Work
Possible vulnerability to coercion via semantic or random subliminal channels
has been identified in the Chaum and Neff schemes [24]. Note, however, that this
may no longer be the true of the Neff scheme in its current implementation [1].
In [32] Ryan et al show that Preˆt a` Voter is robust against these attacks, but
is potentially vulnerable to kleptographic channel attacks [18]. In creating the
ballot forms, the authority would select seed values in such a way as to encode
the ordering of the candidate lists in the onion values, and so that a certain
keyed hash applied to the onion value would reveal the corresponding candidate
order. If the key is shared with a colluding third party, this could lay the scheme
open to coercion. Chain-voting, which could be regarded as a form of coercion,
is also possible. In this attack, an outsider obtains an unused ballot form and
marks it with his vote selection. He then either pays or forces a voter to cast it
at the polling station. If the voter returns with a fresh form, the attack can be
repeated. Possible counter-measures for both attacks have been discussed in [32]
and [33].
Note that coercion-resistance may also fail if the coercer knows exactly how
many votes his chosen candidate will get, and can work out whether or not the
target voter voted in a certain way. Juels et al observe that coercion-resistance
depends to an extent on the coercer’s knowledge of how the “honest” voters
will vote. In reality, the coercer may have an idea of percentage votes, but not
exactly how many [23].
Juels et al have proposed a formal definition of coercion-resistance, which is
verified using cryptographic proof techniques [23]. This is based on the compu-
tational infeasibility of the attacker guessing whether the voter evades coercion,
hands over a “fake” key, or submits to coercion, that is, hands the “true” key
over to the coercer. Their definition includes resistance to randomisation, forced
abstention and simulation attacks, in addition to the inability of a voter to prove
her vote. In a randomisation attack, the voter is coerced into to casting a ran-
domly composed ballot, effectively nullifying her vote with a large probability.
The voter is also under duress to cast the ballot provided by the coercer, if she
is unable to determine the value of the vote. In a forced abstention attack, the
voter is bribed or forced not to vote at all. As an example of a simulation attack,
the coercer casts a vote using the keying material issued to the target voter. As
described in the analysis to follow, this can occur in the FOO scheme. In [14],
Delaune et al describe an attack similar to randomisation [23], but in addition
to rendering votes as invalid, enables the coercer to identify voters who do not
comply with his wishes. In Section 4, Preˆt a` Voter is examined w.r.t. this notion
of “full” coercion-resistance.
In [15], Delaune et al provide definitions for both “receipt-freeness” and
coercion-resistance using the applied pi-calculus [2]. They show that “receipt-
freeness” implies privacy, and that coercion-resistance implies “receipt-freeness”.
To model coercion-resistance, it is assumed that the voter, V interacts with the
coercer, C, whereas with “receipt-freeness”, there is no interaction between V
and C during the protocol, but V can later prove her vote to C. They observe
that coercion-freeness is related to secrecy in that only the voter knows how she
voted. However, it is necessarily a stronger property to account for the possibility
that the voter may cooperate with the coercer.
We noted earlier that in a remote scheme, it is difficult to prevent the phys-
ical presence of a coercer at the time a vote is cast, and there needs to be an
opportunity for the voter to cast her vote unobserved. Clarkson et al address
this problem in a remote implementation of Preˆt a` Voter [13]. The voter is issued
a “capability”, which is essentially an encrypted proof of validity. The voter can
choose to submit a vote using this capability, or some random string. The idea is
that the coercer should not be able to distinguish between them. If under duress,
the voter could use the “fake” capability, perhaps submitting a vote of her own
choice using the valid capability at a later time. In the case of vote-buying, the
voter would not be able prove how she voted to a third party, as it would be
uncertain whether she used the valid or the “fake” capability. In the tallying
phase, the invalid votes would be discarded. This is similar in principle to work
by Juels et al [23], mentioned earlier, in which the voter has the choice of using
either a valid or “fake” credential.
3 Preˆt a` Voter and the FOO Scheme - Overviews
3.1 Preˆt a` Voter
The following is an overview of Preˆt a` Voter. Much of the technical detail is
omitted, as it is not necessary in the present context. The scheme is described
by way of an example ballot form, shown in the diagram below.
Nihilist
Buddhist
Anarchist
Sophist
7rJ94K
Fig. 1. A Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
The voter makes her selection in the conventional way, by placing a cross
against the candidate of choice. To cast the vote, the voter separates the right-
and left-hand strips. The left-hand strip should be destroyed, for example, by
feeding it into a shredder. The right-hand strip is placed under an optical reader,
which records the information on the right-hand strip, that is, the value at
the bottom of the strip and the position of the “X”. To be more precise, it is
the numerical representation of the cell containing the “X” which is recorded.
The role of the value “7rJ94K” is explained shortly. The right-hand strip is
then returned to the voter to retain as her receipt. Figure 2 shows a receipt for
“Sophist”.
X7rJ94K
Fig. 2. A Preˆt a` Voter receipt
To ensure authenticity, the ballot forms would be augmented with various
anti-counterfeiting devices, and a digital signature applied to the receipt when
the vote is cast.
Aside from the retention of a receipt, the process of casting a vote should be
familiar, at least to a UK voter. The candidate lists are randomised against a
base ordering on the ballot forms, so possession of a receipt does not open up the
possibility of coercion or vote-buying. For example, with the following canonical
ordering,
Anarchist
Sophist
Nihilist
Buddhist
Fig. 3. Base Order of Candidate List
the ballot form shown in Figure 1 has an offset of 2, which is encoded in
the value “7rJ94K” at the bottom right-hand side of the form. Known as the
“onion”, this value represents the offset which has been successively encrypted
under the secret keys of a number of tellers.
Once decrypted, the numerical value of the marked vote, in this case, 4, with
the offset removed, yields the value 2, which translates as a vote for “Sophist”.
Clearly, as long as the left-hand strip is removed, the right-hand strip alone does
not indicate which way the vote was cast. In contrast to other voter-verifiable
schemes, the vote value is not directly encrypted to form the receipt. Instead,
the (randomised) frame of reference, i.e., the order of the candidate list against
which the vote is represented, is encrypted. Only the tellers acting in consort
are able to reconstruct the candidate order and recover the vote value encoded
in the receipt.
Once all voting has ceased, the receipts are transmitted to a central tabu-
lation server which posts them to a secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB). This
is a write-only, publicly visible facility. Only the tabulation server can write to
this and, once written, anything posted to it will remain unchanged. Voters can
visit the WBB and confirm that their receipt appears correctly. After a suitable
period allowing voters to do this, the set of tellers take over and perform a ro-
bust, anonymising, decryption mix on the batch of posted receipts. Randomised
partial checking [21] is used to ensure that the votes have a high probability of
being correctly decrypted.
If all the steps are performed faithfully and the entities engaging in the pro-
cess are trustworthy, one can be reasonably confident that the election will be
accurate and that the vote values are kept secret. However, the aim of schemes
like Preˆt a` Voter, and the ones devised by Chaum and Neff, is to achieve these
goals without assuming trust in any of the components of the system. The mecha-
nisms used to detect any malfunction or misbehaviour by the devices or processes
that comprise the Preˆt a` Voter scheme are outlined below. There are essentially
three places in the protocol where things could go wrong with respect to the
accuracy requirement.
– The ballot form might be incorrectly constructed and the information
encoded in the onion might not correspond to the candidate order shown
on the left-hand strip. Subsequent decryption of the receipt would then
reveal a different vote value to the one selected by the voter.
– The receipt might be incorrectly recorded or transmitted to the Web
bulletin board.
– The tellers might fail to correctly decrypt the receipts.
There are two ways in which construction of the ballot forms can be checked.
The first is through a random audit performed by independent entities prior to
the election. Using the tellers to strip of the layers of encryption, the crypto-
graphic material can be recovered, and the offsets for the forms re-computed.
In addition, voters can cast “dummy” votes. For each trial, the tellers return
the value of the vote, and, if correct, the voter can be reasonably assured that
the form is properly constructed. For both types of check, it is important that
the used forms are discarded, as the cryptographic material or votes have been
revealed. Test voting could be carried out in the presence of an official, who
subsequently enforces the destruction of used ballot forms.
Once a vote has been cast, the voter can use her receipt to check the WBB,
and make sure that it has been correctly transmitted and recorded. It is impor-
tant that the ballot forms are authenticated, as this prevents dishonest voters
from disproving the system. Conversely, voters are protected against a dishonest
system.
Full details of Preˆt a` Voter, including construction of the ballot forms and
the mix process, can be found in [12].
3.2 The FOO Scheme
Fujoika et al [17] devised the voting scheme which has become known as FOO.
Unlike Preˆt a` Voter, the voter participates in a cryptographic exchange with the
system, and can be remote from the system.
The key players in the scheme are the voters, an administrator and a collec-
tor, and there are three stages. In the first stage, the voter prepares a ballot and
sends it to the administrator for verification and proof of eligibility. As explained
shortly, blind signatures [10] are used to ensure ballot secrecy, and bit commit-
ment [26] and digital signatures to ensure legitimacy and “unreusability” [17],
that is, only legitimate voters may vote, and once only. It is assumed that all
three cryptographic schemes cannot be broken [17]. The main steps are outlined
as follows. Further details can be found in [17].
– The voter, V computes a ballot c = ξ(v, k) for a vote, v, using a bit
commitment scheme, ξ, and a random key, ki.
– V computes the message m = χ(c, f), using a blinding function, χ, and
a random blinding factor, f .
– V sends her digitally signed message σV (m) to the administrator, A,
together with her identity.
– A checks that V has the right to vote, has not voted yet, and that her
signature is valid. If all these are true, A digitally signs m, returning
σA(m) to V .
In the next stage, the voter checks the ballot and casts her vote.
– V unblinds the signed message, σA(m), obtaining b = σA(c), that is, the
signed commitment to her vote.
– V then sends b on an anonymous channel to the collector, C
– C checks that A’s signature is valid, and if so, enters (l, b, c) on a list as
the lth item.
After a certain period of time has elapsed, the collector starts the final stage.
– C publishes the list of signed commitments, (li, bi, ci).
– V verifies her commitment, and sends l, k to C via an anonymous chan-
nel.
– C then obtains V ’s vote from the lth ballot, and publishes v.
Note that the relationship between the ballot, c, and voter’s key, k, are hidden
by the blinding factor, f . As c and k are sent to the counter via an anonymous
channel, the identity of the voter cannot be linked to the vote, v. In order to
vote twice, the voter would have to obtain another valid signed vote, which can
only be done by breaking the bit commitment scheme. Similarly, an illegitimate
voter would have to break the digital signature scheme to obtain a valid ballot.
Kremer et al [25] have carried out a security analysis of FOO using the applied
pi-calculus [2]. They report that FOO satisfies many of the requirements of voting
schemes such as fairness, eligibility, secrecy and individual verifiability, that is,
voters can verify that their votes were correctly recorded. However, they observe
that, although not stated explicitly in [17], the protocol must be synchronised at
two points to ensure fairness and secrecy. Firstly, registration must be completed
before vote casting can take place, and secondly, the Collector must publish all
the decrypted votes at once. If this does not happen, an attacker could, for
example, block all registration until V has cast her vote, and then link V to her
decrypted vote. Furthermore, early publishing of votes undermines fairness, as
it amounts to release of partial results.
Another problem with the FOO scheme, as mentioned earlier, is that it is
vulnerable to coercion. Although the scheme is claimed to satisfy ballot secrecy,
legitimacy and eligibility [17], [25], these requirements could also be at risk.
4 Coercion-resistance in Preˆt a` Voter
In this section, the requirements for coercion-resistance in Preˆt a` Voter are in-
formally expressed as opacity properties. Examining the scheme, there appear
to be four cases to consider, all of which depend on the power of the coercer.
They are discussed below.
– The coercer is unable to obtain any unused ballot forms and can only
observe the Web bulletin board.
The coercer is only able to scan the published list of encrypted receipts,
and also the list of decrypted votes. As he has not seen any ballot forms,
he does not know the associations between the onion values and cor-
responding candidate lists. Even if he managed to persuade a voter to
make a particular choice, the published lists do not provide any evidence
of how she voted. This is true as long as destruction of the left-hand
strips is enforced, or “decoy” left-hand strips are made freely available
in the booth [32]. Otherwise, the voter may be able to prove her vote.
Recalling the informal definition of opacity, the predicate, φ is opaque,
if for every run of the system in which φ true, there is an observationally
equivalent run in which it is false. Expressing the above in terms of
opacity, the value of the voter’s vote is opaque to the coercer. Another
way of stating this is that for every event in which a vote is cast by the
voter, there is another such event corresponding to the same voter, but
with a different vote, and the coercer cannot distinguish between the
two events. This accounts for the possibility that one of the votes was
chosen by the coercer. Note that it is actually the association between
the onion and corresponding candidate list that is opaque, and that the
coercer could be any observer, except the voter herself.
– The coercer can obtain an unused ballot form and also observe the Web
bulletin board.
In this case, the coercer can note the onion value on the ballot form,
make his vote selection, and threaten or bribe a voter to cast it at a
polling station. He can then find out whether or not the voter followed
his instructions by scanning the published list of encrypted receipts.
The second case demonstrates that Preˆt a` Voter is potentially vulnerable
to chain-voting if an outsider gets hold of a fresh ballot form. As sug-
gested in [32], a possible counter-measure is to conceal the onion values,
for example, with scratch strips, until votes are actually cast. In [33]
Ryan et al propose a variant of this idea, whereby the candidate list is
concealed until the time of vote casting.
With the scratch strip mechanism in place, the coercer would not be
able to associate onion values with corresponding candidate lists, and
hence, to identify any one receipt from the list published on the bulletin
board. It follows that this requirement could be expressed as previously:
that the association between the onion and corresponding candidate list
is opaque to the observer. We discuss this further shortly. In a physical
sense, the scratch strips serve to render the value of the votes opaque.
We next re-examine the scheme with concealed onion values.
– The coercer can obtain an unused ballot form and also observe the Web
bulletin board. However, the onion value has been concealed with a
scratch strip. The coercer cannot determine the onion value without
removing the scratch strip and invalidating the ballot form.
A possible procedure for voting utilising the scratch strip mechanism
is as follows [32]. In the booth, the voter marks her choice on a ballot
form, and detaches and destroys the left-hand strip. She next presents
her receipt to an official who checks that the scratch strip is intact. The
voter now removes the scratch strip and casts her vote. This rules out the
possibility of an outsider having seen and noted the association between
the onion and corresponding candidate, which as before, is opaque to
the observer.
– A further case is where the coercer can obtain unused ballot forms, ob-
serve the Web bulletin board, and is also in collusion with a corrupt
authority who has complete knowledge of the ballot form information.
Even with the onion values concealed by scratch strips, the coercer can
prove any particular vote if the necessary information is leaked by the
authority. One way to defeat coercion, is for the ballot material to be
generated in such a way that no single party has complete knowledge of
the association between the onion values and corresponding candidate
offsets. In this case, the requirement for coercion-resistance could still be
expressed with the opacity statement given above. A possible scheme for
distributed ballot creation in Preˆt a` Voter is proposed in [33].
The above analysis illustrates that one way to increase coercion-resistance in
Preˆt a` Voter is to prevent chain-voting attacks. We have considered the use of the
scratch strip mechanism suggested in [32], and also highlighted the importance
of avoiding single authority knowledge of ballot form information.
Note that, “coercion-resistance” as used above, includes all the criteria set
out by Juels et al in [23], that is, resistance to forced abstention, randomisation
and simulation attacks, as well as the inability of a voter to prove her vote to
a third party. The first is true unless the coercer can obtain evidence that the
target voter actually cast a vote. This would be difficult in a supervised scheme,
such as Preˆt a` Voter, unless the coercer is able to closely monitor the procedures
inside a booth. As Preˆt a` Voter ballot forms are prepared ahead of time, and a
vote is indicated only by a mark against the chosen candidate, randomisation
attacks should not be a problem. The coercer would not be able to supply the
voter with a randomly constructed ballot form, unless he was in collusion with
the authority. Note that this is distinct from random subliminal channel attacks,
as described in [24], where either the voter or device provide carefully chosen
random inputs to create a ballot receipt. Chain-voting could be regarded as a
form of simulation, since the coercer effectively votes under another identity.
However, as before, without knowing the associations between onion values and
corresponding candidate lists, the coercer would have no proof his vote was cast.
Note also that “full” coercion-resistance [23] holds as long as the coercer is not
in league with the authority.
From the analysis, it can be seen that there are no opportunities for coercion
in Preˆt a` Voter via subliminal channels as identified in [24]. However, finding the
most effective and viable defences against chain-voting attacks is the subject of
ongoing research.
In the next section, the analysis of Kremer et al in [25] is extended with an
analysis of coercion-resistance in the FOO scheme.
5 Coercion-resistance in FOO - an Analysis
As previously mentioned, the FOO scheme has been analysed for several security
requirements, such as ballot secrecy, legitimacy and fairness in [17] and [25].
Both papers acknowledge, somewhat indirectly, that the scheme does not satisfy
“receipt-freeness” but do not discuss this problem in any detail. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first analysis of coercion-resistance in the FOO scheme.
Studying the protocol, it appears that there are three cases to consider, each
reflecting different powers of the coercer. They are as follows.
– The coercer can only observe the bulletin board, and does not know the
value of the random factor used by the target voter to commit her vote.
Recall that the voter, V ’s commitment to her vote, c = ξ(v, k), which
has been signed by the Administrator, is initially published alongside an
index number, l. The voter verifies her vote, and then sends l and k, the
random factor used to commit her vote, to the Collector, who obtains
and finally publishes the value of v. Without k, the coercer would not
be able to construct a proof of V ’s vote. In terms of opacity, the value
of V ’s vote is opaque to the observer. More precisely, it is the random
factor used by V to commit her vote that is opaque.
Note that in the original paper, the actual set of values from which the
voter makes her selection is unspecified. It is conceivable that the coercer
could supply the voter with some unique or random value, in which case,
just by looking at the final list of decrypted votes, he would be able to
determine whether or not his instructions were carried out. However, if
the value of the vote is not unique, then without the voter’s cooperation,
either forced or willing, the scheme is, in this case, coercion-resistant.
The next two cases show how the voter could be coerced.
– The coercer computes a blinded, committed vote. The target voter, either
willingly or under duress, digitally signs and sends it to the administra-
tor, along with her ID. Alternatively, the voter could supply the coercer
with her signing keys. When the encrypted vote has been signed and
returned by the administrator, the coercer then performs the remaining
steps in the protocol.
This attack demonstrates that coercion-resistance is difficult to guaran-
tee in a remote system if the coercer manages to obtain the voter’s keys
and evades authentication. Having computed the ballot, and with knowl-
edge of the required cryptographic values, the coercer can complete the
protocol for his vote choice using the voter’s digital signature. Note that
this is an example of a simulation attack [23].
– The coercer supplies the target voter with a vote. The voter computes a
blinded, committed vote, then follows the steps for registration and vot-
ing. When the list of encrypted votes is published, the voter supplies the
coercer with k, the random factor used to commit the vote. The coercer
then checks that the supplied vote has been correctly transmitted, and
if satisfied, either completes the final steps or instructs the voter to do
so.
Similar to the case above, this again illustrates the difficulty of achieving
coercion-resistance in a remote system, where a third party can observe
the voting process. It also shows a weakness in the protocol in that once
the coercer obtains the random factor, k, the proof of a vote is irrefutable.
I discuss this further shortly.
It appears that, in the FOO scheme, coercion-resistance holds for a “passive”
coercer, that is, one who only observes the published lists of encrypted and
decrypted votes. In this case the value of the voter’s vote, or more precisely, the
random factor used to commit the vote, is opaque to the coercer. As discussed
previously, the “coercer” could be any observer other than the voter.
The remaining two cases in analysis above show that the FOO scheme is
weak in terms of coercion-resistance. This is partly due to the problem of pre-
venting third party intervention during remote voting, as shown in the second
case, and partly due to the design of the protocol, as shown in the third case.
In [30], Okamoto proposes a voting scheme similar to FOO, in which trapdoor
bit-commitment is used to enable multiple possible decryptions of a committed
vote. However, he later showed that the scheme also required physical assump-
tions, such as “untappable” channels [16] or a voting booth to satisfy “receipt-
freeness” [31]. Further treatment of this is beyond the present scope, and the
reader is referred to [30] and [31] for details.
From the analysis of Preˆt a` Voter and FOO, it appears that opacity can be
used for succinct expressions of coercion-resistance. By the definition of opacity,
the observer should not be able to distinguish between two runs of the system,
one in which the predicate, φ, is true, and another in which it is false. This
relates closely to recent models of coercion-resistance where a coercer is unable
to establish whether the target voter used a “fake” or valid encryption of her
vote [23], [13]. It also takes care of the possibility of the coercer confirming a
putative cryptographic value, that is, succeeding in a guessing attack.
Furthermore, by altering the definition of the predicate, φ, and the observer’s
view, opacity adapts readily to the requirements of two markedly different voting
protocols, in this case Preˆt a` Voter and the FOO scheme. It would be interesting
to apply a similar analysis to other voting schemes as a future extension to this
work.
So far, informal opacity statements have been used to express particular
requirements for coercion-resistance. In the next section, the intuitive statements
are consolidated by a formal statement of general coercion-resistance in terms
of opacity. Potentially, this could be applied in a variety of different situations,
and in a range of different systems.
6 Coercion-resistance Cast as Opacity
In carrying out the analysis of coercion-resistance in Preˆt a` Voter and the FOO
scheme, a “threat model” was obtained in each case. Both threat models consist
of the possible ways in which the voter could be coerced, and, as might be ex-
pected, vary for each scheme. These requirements were then informally expressed
in terms of opacity.
There were four cases to consider in Preˆt a` Voter, and three in the FOO
scheme, each taking into account different capabilities of the coercer. In Preˆt a`
Voter, the requirement for coercion-resistance, expressed as opacity, is that the
association between the onion and corresponding candidate list should be opaque
to the coercer. In the FOO scheme the requirement is that the random factor
used by the voter to commit her vote should be opaque to the coercer. As shown
above, this only holds in the case of a “passive” coercer, and is not otherwise
preserved by the protocol. The two opacity statements highlight the difference
between the two schemes: in FOO, the voter participates in a cryptographic
exchange with the system, whereas this is not the case in Preˆt a` Voter. To
derive the opacity statements in each case, the predicate, φ, has been defined
according to the property that should be opaque to the coercer.
Coercion-resistance is now formally cast as opacity. A formal definition of
opacity is given in Appendix A.
The basic intuition is that even if the voter is prepared to reveal her secrets
to the coercer, she should not be able to prove which way she voted. Let λv,k
denote a run in which the voter casts a vote v, using a key, k. Let S be the
system, C the set of available candidates and K the set of available keys.
S is coercion-resistant if
∀λv,k ∈ τ(S), ∀v′ ∈ C, ∀k ∈ K, ∃k′ ∈ K, such that λv′,k′ ∈ τ(S) and
obsk′(λv,k) = obsk′(λv′,k′),
where obsk denotes the observation function that the coercer can apply to
his view of the election protocol, “informed” by his “knowledge” of k. By the
definition above, he is unable to tell whether the voter submitted v using a key
k, or the coercer’s vote choice, v′ using a key, k′, which has been “revealed” to
the coercer.
This is a generic definition of coercion-resistance, which can be specialised ac-
cording to a particular voting scheme. A model is then needed for the scheme and
obsk must be defined. Note that this definition is not a direct casting coercion-
resistance as opacity, as the predicate, φ, has not been defined. It could be
regarded as an “unwinding” of the stricter form, and would be easier to use in
practice.
For example, basing the model for Preˆt a` Voter on results of the analysis,
the association between the onion and corresponding candidate list should be
opaque to the coercer, and is denoted by k in the definition above. For coercion-
resistance in the FOO scheme, it is the random factor, k, used to commit a vote,
that should be opaque to the coercer. However, as mentioned previously, this
does not hold in a run of the protocol, except in the case of a “passive” coercer.
7 Conclusion
Coercion-resistance is an essential requirement for voting systems as it entails
several other desirable properties, such as secrecy, legitimacy and eligibility. It
is therefore of no surprise that it has generated a great deal of interest in the
field, and there have been several proposals for formal definitions of coercion-
resistance, as well as voting systems that claim to be coercion-resistant. We have
contributed to this interesting and valuable work with an analysis of coercion-
resistance in two markedly different voting systems, Preˆt a` Voter and the FOO
scheme, and a definition of coercion-resistance based on opacity.
Preˆt a` Voter has a high resistance to coercion, mainly due to the fact that
random inputs are not required from the voter or voting device in receipt prepa-
ration, and that voting is supervised. As described in [24], such random choices
open up the possibility of coercion via semantic or random subliminal channels.
However, in Preˆt a` Voter, the ballot forms are prepared ahead of time, and an
unmarked form which falls into the hands of a third party could be used to
initiate a chain-voting attack. This could be regarded as a form of coercion, and
counter-measures, such as concealing the onion until the vote is actually cast,
have been discussed in [32]. In the FOO scheme, voters participate in ballot
creation, and hold the keys used to encrypt and verify their votes. Coercion is a
problem, as the keys could fall into the wrong hands.
This is believed to be the first analysis of coercion-resistance in the FOO
scheme. In addition, coercion-resistance has been examined from a new angle in
both schemes, i.e., in terms of opacity, and this has indicated a close relationship
between the two properties. A formal definition has been proposed for coercion-
resistance cast as opacity and its possible application discussed, using Preˆt a`
Voter and the FOO scheme as examples.
Voting systems vary widely in structure and operation, and likewise their
requirements for coercion-resistance. Due to its generality, opacity has the flex-
ibility to accommodate these differences. For example, coercion-resistance re-
quirements in both Preˆt a` Voter and the FOO scheme can be expressed, in each
case, by altering the predicate, φ, over which opacity is defined. A more complete
instantiation is the subject of future work.
The work presented in this paper demonstrates that opacity is a highly useful
and flexible tool both for expressing properties and security analysis.
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A Opacity - A Formal Definition
The following is a formal definition of opacity [5]. The opacity framework is
currently based on the labelled transition system, which is defined below.
Definition 1 A labelled transition system (LTS) is a tuple Π = (S,L,∆), where
S is the (potentially infinite) set of states, L, is the (potentially infinite) set of
labels, ∆ ⊆ S×L×S, is the transition relation, and S0 is the set of initial states.
We consider only deterministic LTSs and so for transitions (s, l, s′), (s, l, s′′) ∈ ∆
it is the case that s′ = s′′.
This provides a very general model, which can be adapted for other formal
methods.
A run of the LTS can be defined as follows.
Definition 2 A run of the LTS is a pair (s0, λ), where s0 ∈ S0, λ = l1 . . . ln, li ∈
L is a finite sequence of labels such that there are states s1, . . . , sn satisfying
(si−1, li, si) for i = 1, . . . ,n . We will denote the state sn by s0 ⊕ λ, and call it
reachable from s. The set of all runs is denoted by run(Π).
In the rest of this section, let the LTS be Π = (S,L,∆, S0), as defined
above, and Θ, a set of elements called observables. Next, are definitions for an
observation function, obs, which can be used to model the ability an observer
may have to gain information about the system.
Definition 3 Any function obs: run(Π) → Θ∗ is an observation function. It
can be called label-based and static if there is a mapping obs′ : L→ Θ ∪{²} such
that for every run (s, λ) of Π, obs(s, λ) = obs(l1) . . . obs′(ln), where λ = l1 . . . ln.
Static functions only allow the observer to interpret the same label in the
same way. Dynamic, Orwellian, m-Orwellian and state-based functions have also
been defined. For details, see [5].
In defining opacity, the concern is whether the observer can deduce that an
observed execution belongs to the set of runs for which φ holds.
Definition 4 A predicate φ over run(Π) is opaque w.r.t. the observation func-
tion obs if, for every run (s, λ) ∈ φ, there is a run (s′, λ′) /∈ φ such that
obs(s, λ) = obs(s′, λ′).
This is a general definition for opacity, which can be varied according to the
requirements of the particular application.
